Disappearance is a good idea


Beyond the limits of justice

Keywords: image of man, education, equality, law, disability studies, inclusion, equality, people with learning difficulties, UN convention, participation
Text type: magazine article
Release info: Published in: Disabled people, magazine for living together, learning and working, No. 1/2013, topic: Disappeared disabled people? Pp. 33-42. Disabled people (1/2013)
: © Markus Dederich 2013

The idea of ​​inclusion is to have a rapid career that hardly anyone would have expected a few years ago. If one considers the professional discourse in curative and special education and the diverse activities in the realm of politics, then it is difficult to avoid the impression that some scientific commentators write themselves in a state of ecstasy and some politicians in a whirlpool of actionism to lose. It seems all the more urgent to pause and reflect on developments calmly and with critical distance.

Inclusion and the disappearance of people

This pause and critical reflection is not intended to go behind achievements such as those of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or to question the idea of ​​inclusion. For this convention, too, applies that the "reference to given rights [...] is the decisive argument in the social debate about legal equality and social participation" (Heidenreich 2011, 87) will. At the same time, however, it is essential not to stop critical thinking, but rather to remember some very problematic aspects. The following considerations should make a small contribution to this.

Such problematic aspects are well known and have been mentioned again and again in recent years. However, I am concerned with two fundamental problems, both of which are systematically related to the question of whether or not inclusion is divisible. The first problem concerns the position that is often adopted in the discourse and, above all, the underlying position of the actual policy, which assumes a pragmatic divisibility of inclusion. In particular, it turns out to be difficult to find ethically plausible criteria for this divisibility. The second problem concerns the opposite pole of the spectrum of positions, namely the position advocating the indivisibility of inclusion. Because the normative postulate of indivisibility proves (apart from the fact that it could turn out to be illusory) in a certain respect as ethically problematic. Under the prerequisite - which is decisive for the consideration presented here - that inclusion is not an option, but that the education and social system is consistently inclusive, the dilemma could arise that what is right for most is by no means right for everyone . My thesis here is that the consistent implementation of inclusion under the sign of justice could produce new injustices.

To put it in a nutshell: If the implementation of an idea becomes more important than the consequences that the implementation has for people, then a critical imbalance is created because the individual person in his singularity, uniqueness and incomparability is no longer important, but rather on a special one Case of a general or a mere disturbance variable. This is what is meant when the title speaks of a "disappearance of man". This formulation is not an allusion to Foucault and his thesis of the disappearance of humans in the sense of a specific, specifically modern subject construction (cf. Foucault 1974, 462).

My thoughts and questions relate to inclusion as an idea. It is important to emphasize this, because to this day the concept of inclusion is anything but unambiguous. There are descriptive-analytical and prescriptive or normative modes of use, and a distinction is often not made clearly enough between the two. As an idea that the layout Concerning not only the educational system, but also the social and society in general, inclusion is strongly prescriptive and normatively charged. It is a concept of value that prescribes a certain direction of action. This action is intended to realize a good that can be described in ethical terms: on the one hand, it should strengthen social cohesion, on the other hand it should make a decisive contribution to the integration of previously marginalized individuals and groups into society. If one wanted to paraphrase the core of the idea in terms of political philosophy, inclusion would above all be a question of recognition, participation and justice. Therefore, inclusion is often associated with the idea of ​​political equality, human rights and the democratic development of society. Many advocates of inclusion assume that a humane society cannot do without the realization of this good, indeed that it only becomes truly humane when it is realized.

Understanding inclusion as an idea in this way has important consequences for scientific reflection and research. If inclusion is an ethical good, one cannot prove the correctness or falsity of the concept on the basis of empirical arguments, but rather the practicability of certain implementation strategies. However, proof of whether something is feasible and practicable is not proof of the ethical correctness or falsehood of the idea as such. However, empirical findings can be used to check whether, in what respect and with what restrictions, real forms and accompanying effects of the implementation of the idea of ​​inclusion can be shown as ethically legitimate.

Divisibility or indivisibility of inclusion?

I'll start with the first problem. If we look at the discourse on inclusion and its implementation, there are also controversial, even irreconcilable positions among proponents. Above all, this concerns the question of whether inclusion is divisible or not. As I would like to sketch below, both positions are not free from pitfalls.

Some (I call them the radical, innovative, idealistic inclusionists) assume a radical idea of ​​inclusion that does not accept any prior exclusions. You read a comprehensive inclusion requirement from the. The others (I call them the structurally conservative, pragmatic integrationists) reject such a far-reaching claim and believe for their part that their position is covered by them. According to her, one has to approach the matter pragmatically and accept imperfections.

Let us assume for the moment that indivisibility is one of the basic principles of inclusion as a social and educational policy concept. Indivisibility can only mean: It is about the inclusion of all, without exceptions. From this point of view, the proposal to refrain from indivisibility of inclusion for pragmatic reasons would be tantamount to destroying the very idea of ​​inclusion. Nonetheless, the group of pragmatic integrationists prefers differentiated solutions, which means doing one thing without leaving the other. In practice, for example with regard to schools, this amounts to maintaining a two-pronged system that includes schools alongside the other types of schools and Includes special schools. From the point of view of the idealistic inclusionists, such a system inevitably implies that the idea of ​​inclusion is infiltrated by a moment of exclusivity and that its basic substance is possibly attacked. Let's take the concept of the two-pronged strategy a little further. In their report, which is primarily interested in a pragmatic implementation, Preuss-Lausitz and Klemm assume that 85 percent of the pupils with special educational needs can receive inclusive schooling. Without doubting that such a quota would be a huge step forward compared to today - provided the inclusion is well done - the question arises as to what the remaining 15 percent is made up of?

Would the emergence of a residual school for the hard, non-integrable core be a step forward or a sign of the failure of the system and the failure of inclusion? Or would the emergence of a residual school be due to fundamental (i.e. non-shiftable) limits of inclusion? But how would such a limit in principle be justified? Are there disorders that speak against inclusion per se? That would mean, however, that the idea of ​​the inclusion of all without exception is wrong insofar as it calls for something fundamentally impossible. Or would the creation of a residual school be a pragmatic concession? In this case the question arises as to which standards and criteria this pragmatics is based on. Or are there no general criteria and the exclusion from inclusion takes place depending on the situation, e.g. due to the presence or absence of suitable framework conditions and resources? But that would make the demarcation completely arbitrary and contingent and thus anything but fair. It is therefore quite consequential to ask whether the quota sought by Preuss-Lausitz and Klemm is based on empirical-practical or normative criteria.

To illustrate the problem with an example: If, for example, massive teaching disruptions by students with serious behavioral problems or socio-emotional developmental problems are a criterion for exclusion from inclusion, then the question naturally arises as to where exactly in the very broad spectrum of manifestations and intensity of these problems or abnormalities, the boundary between suitability and unsuitability for inclusion lies and the extent to which this limit is influenced by situational, personal and structural framework conditions. Another criterion could be the prognostic assessment of whether inclusion can “succeed” at all in a given individual case. The immediate question that arises here is what the criteria for success are: social interaction and mutual appreciation? Smooth running of lessons? Quantifiable educational gains among schoolchildren? Or any weighted combination of criteria?

At this point we would like to briefly point out an adjacent, equally significant problem. Because there is not only the view that inclusion is divisible. Lately it has been heard more and more that there are also limits to school education and that consequently not only system differentiation, but also exclusion from the education system as a whole is viewed as a legitimate option. In the meantime this seems to be a politically acceptable idea again. For example, in Section 40 (2) of the draft bill for the “First Act to Implement the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Schools (9th School Law Amendment Act)” of 9/10/12: “For schoolchildren who, even after exhausting all possibilities, do not receive special educational support can be promoted, compulsory schooling is suspended. "

Regardless of whether this passage is included in the legal text at the end, this small and harmless formulation raises questions: What criteria can be used to know that all possibilities for special needs education have been exhausted? Who defines these criteria and checks whether they apply? Even more fundamentally, however, in the sense of non-exclusion, the question would be whether funding is also appropriate and perhaps precisely when nothing works anymore, when an apparently final standstill has occurred. A central finding of Enlightenment pedagogy was that humans are not only malleable, but also need education in order to develop their humanity. From here it must be stated that the exclusion from education of severely disabled people amounts to a surrender of their humanity.

Jantzen (2012) again found that the general appreciation of heterogeneity contains a lot of wrong rhetoric, because it can be observed that there are unbroken tendencies towards exclusion. With recourse to a sociological, descriptive-analytical concept of inclusion, Jantzen's argument shows that the prescriptive-normative concept of inclusion, which dominates pedagogical discourse, can be misused to cover up factual exclusion. According to Jantzen, for example, exclusion is politically produced by the fact that people with severe or complex disabilities “are treated from the outset as non-inclusive remnants, as if they did not have the same right to have all rights, even if today we give them in many ways cannot yet guarantee ”(p. 41). While there is talk of inclusion on the front stage, "on the backstage, people are further excluded and made invisible" (p. 42).

"As long as there is talk of easy language, redefinition of people with learning difficulties and participation on the front stage, or as long as 'It is normal to be different' leads to the talk of 'behaviorally original' people who accumulate on the backstage in special groups of large institutions or in Dormitories are hidden, where increasingly poorly paid female employees have to do an ever greater amount of work and none of this is discussed […], where general social exclusion disappears under the 'It is normal to be different', can neither be included nor guaranteed Human rights to be discussed ”(p. 43).

As the example of people with severe and complex disabilities shows, “keeping open” our image of people - a central concern of the idea of ​​inclusion - often does not succeed in social practice. As long as the social, educational and health systems are predominantly economically oriented and strive to maximize efficiency and the outlined aesthetic and psychological mechanisms of exclusion continue to work, the well-intentioned and undoubtedly sympathetic commitments to inclusion will come to nothing or come up against seemingly insurmountable limits . If inclusion, as many of its proponents say, is a fit, then making minor adjustments is not enough. Then you have to take a look at society and culture as a whole and critically examine where and how systematically non-fits that result in exclusion or marginalization are created or maintained.

It is clear that shared inclusion raises significant ethical questions and is extremely problematic. But what about total inclusion that is regarded as indivisible?

Is indivisible inclusion fair?

With this question, the project of the radical inclusionists is viewed critically. In the discourse of the broad advocates of inclusion, the idea of ​​justice has played an important role in two variants for several years: as social justice and as educational justice (cf. Lindmeier 2008, 2012; Prengel 2012).In Reich (2012) it reads like this: The aim of justice is to increase everyone's chances of participating in education. According to Reich, this goal cannot be achieved under the conditions of a separating education system. Because such an education system either systematically creates inequality or it not only does not remove existing inequalities, but reinforces them. That is why it is primarily a matter of reducing discrimination and raising the level of education as a whole, i.e. also for schoolchildren with special educational needs. The central keyword is "equal opportunities" under the conditions of "diversity", i.e. the factual existence of a variety of individual, social and cultural differences. Reich formulates one of his main demands as follows: "Above all, society must provide resources and help in the educational system in order to live this diversity and to avoid discrimination of individual groups or individuals in society as a whole, if not overall negative development tendencies In the direction of unjust exclusions and discrimination "(rich 2012, 35).

This is one of the places where empiricism has to come into play. For it is a legitimate question to examine whether what is claimed to be just is actually just. Is it fair - and I'll put it sharply here - when deaf, autistic, tetraplegic children are the only ones of their kind in a class community, so they have no way of feeling part of a peer group of their own kind? Is it fair if pupils with poor learning skills have to experience themselves as underperforming compared to most others in a learning environment that is an achievement environment with increasing duration of schooling? Is it fair if a small but extremely heterogeneous group of disabled students is not taught by specialists whose pedagogical skills are tailored to their needs? Is it fair to grow up in a school environment in which differences are appreciated, but which have a disadvantageous effect at the latest when they transition to the world of work? Is it guaranteed that the goal-different teaching in heterogeneous learning groups does not lead to the formation of new social demarcation lines between "us" and the "others"? In abstract terms: Can the radical inclusionists be sure that their idea of ​​justice will not produce new injustices?

These questions point to a more fundamental philosophical problem that will be considered in more detail below. In the current discourse on the basics of inclusion in curative and special education, there is a clear preference for social theory, political theory or philosophical concepts of justice. Compared to the earlier, more individual-ethical orientation, this is a clear benefit. However, this new preference tends to be somewhat one-sided, so that the unpleasant impression arises that academic reflection has largely lost sight of the individual. With the one-dimensional concentration on environments, structures, systems, institutions and a normative order (for example embodied by law), the individual person with disabilities is neglected in his singularity or reduced to a special case of a general.

This imbalance can be circumvented in that the idea of ​​justice is not conceived in terms of institutions or a contract of fictitious equals, but rather is based on responsibility for the concrete other person. Responsibility initially means nothing other than an unconditional and irrefutable ethical obligation towards this other person. However, this change in perspective has the far-reaching consequence that justice is no longer the sole measure of all things, but must be conceived as a complement to responsibility. This shows that responsibility and justice are in an unavoidable tension.

Responsibility and Justice at Levinas

In the work of Levinas, who is known for his philosophy of radical otherness and his ethics of responsibility, there is a way of thinking about the problem of justice, which subjects it to a fundamental criticism, but at the same time emphasizes its indispensability for human society. Levinas ’thinking about justice revolves around the figure of the so-called" third party ". This figure forms an exciting, contrapuntal addition to responsibility. Responsibility is a specific, namely ethical, relationship to other people. In this context it is significant that Levinas consider the other as radical Understanding others as a person to whom I can be close, but who still eludes access to my knowledge and a complete identification with social attributions. The other is accordingly more than a particular case of a general; it is unique or singular, which means that it undermines the schematism of the general and the particular (cf. Fast 2008).

According to Levinas, there is responsibility towards the other as the other. In other words, it exists regardless of whether this other is my own kind or a stranger, whether I have sympathy for him or not, etc. This is because I did not choose this responsibility freely, but the other puts me into it by being makes unavoidable demands on me. According to Levinas, this relationship of responsibility towards the radically other is asymmetrical because the claim or appeal always precedes the answer. It is precisely this belatedness of the answer to the claim that constitutes the inevitability and asymmetry of responsibility. Now, as Waldenfels emphasizes, the “foreign claim that takes on physical form in the look, in the gesture, in the call of the other [...] is neither justified nor unjustified. [...] A claim in the double sense of claim to someone and claim to something is characterized by that inevitability, this side of being and ought "(Waldenfels 2006, 131). The claim of the other is inevitable. He has already met and affected me before I deal with him, consider him, respond to it or withdraw from him. This means that the claim precedes the responding act of a free subject. "What happens to me willy-nilly is not an act, it becomes an act that I perform by responding to it one way or another" (Waldenfels 2006,109).

The ethical constellation is therefore a relation of responsibility in which the other person, whoever he is, puts me. This inevitability of thinking me is the source of all ethical liability. But this does not say anything about how I fulfill this responsibility and have to fulfill it in a normative sense.

This can only be clarified in view of the figure of the third. This figure stands for the other others who have always existed alongside the other. In addition, it also means institutions that regulate the coexistence of people in society, such as conflict-mediating bodies such as courts or bodies responsible for the distribution of goods, such as the health and education systems. Compared to the ethical inevitability of the answer to the demands of the other, the figure of the third is decisive for that What and How The answer. In democratic societies, which are committed to the principle of equality, such institutions deal with certain tasks or problems according to the basic principle of treating like equals and unequal unequal. In view of the large number of people and their highly diverse demands and needs, the question arises as to who is rightly entitled to what.

According to Levinas, the figure of the third has considerable consequences for the ethical relationship between the ego and the other. It embodies the “moment of justice (of justice). [...] Here the right of the unique, the original law, the human judgment, and thus objectivity, objectification, thematization, synthesis. Institutions are needed to judge and a political authority to support them "(Levinas 1995, 237). The presence of the third person creates the need for comparison, criteria-based weighing, evaluation and hierarchization of various claims, for example in order to be able to make appropriate decisions in conflict situations or when distributing social goods. Such constellations make it unavoidable, in spite of its singularity, to "focus on the particularity (peculiarity) of a specimen of the genus" (Levinas 2011, 343). The radical otherness of the other is brought into relationships of relative equality or inequality through the presence of the third and the social, cultural and political contexts embodied by him.

I summarize: The responsibility and with it the answer to the demands of the other are inescapably imposed on me. This only applies to the that of the answer (turning away is also an answer), but not to the what and how of the answer, because these are not forced by the other. It is up to me how I answer. Through the other others, who address and claim me in the face of the other, I see myself confronted with a multitude of singular and non-comparable claims that make comparison and weighing inevitable. However, this requires well-founded criteria that apply equally to everyone. On this basis, the singular claims, which are incomparable in themselves, are compared and ranked. As inevitable as this may be, it is also clear that in the light of the singularity of the radically other there is a moment of violence inherent in making the unequal. According to Schnell (2008) “by itself [...] the plurality of singular claims is not based on a sequence that determines who I turn to first. Only the introduction of equitable institutions helps to ensure that preferences and disadvantages arise. This burglary, which can hardly be avoided, is fraught with moments of violence because it is based on insufficient reasons ”(p. 124).

By violence it is meant that there is no ultimate justification for justice, i.e. a reason that has no longer receded and which can no longer be reasonably doubted. This means, however, that justice is not only based on reasonable grounds, but is also based on contingent assumptions. Following on from Nietzsche, Derrida (1991), for example, denies the possibility of allowing the idea of ​​justice to be based solely on reasonable grounds. In contrast to the law, which is “adjustable and in accordance with the statutes, calculable, a system of regulated, registered, coded regulations” (p. 44 f), justice according to Derrida is “infinite [...], unpredictable, unruly against every rule, against symmetry strange, heterogeneous and heterotopic ”(p. 44).

Waldenfels (2006) understands the equating of the unequal in the sign of justice as an act of establishing order. Within a certain context someone becomes based on criteria or yardsticks as someone, i.e. understood in a certain way: as a disabled person, as a person in need of care, as a simulant. This determining as or understanding someone as something specific is only possible with recourse to general criteria, i.e. by comparison. But this inevitable and necessary act fails to recognize the otherness of the other. “In this sense, every justice, which has always consisted of treating like equals, treating unequal unequally, has an inherent element of injustice. This is one of the constitutive features of any contingent order that operates selectively and exclusively "(Waldenfels 2006, 127 f.).

In contrast to the radical otherness of the other and the asymmetrical ethical relationship to him, the figure of the third forces equality, symmetry, reciprocity. By being situated in a system of order and in the face of the third person, the individual person achieves the “status” of a legal subject and becomes an equal among equals who has a right to justice. However, in view of experiences with totalitarian systems and the ubiquity of power and violence, Levinas insists on tying justice and also the law, which is clearly different from it, back to the singularity of the other person. In order to preserve the humanity of the other person and for the sake of justice itself, it is essential to repeatedly “pay attention to the human face hidden under the identities of the citizens” (Levinas 1995, 327) and to keep awake the awareness of the responsibility that the face imposes.

In summary, the following applies: the ethical is the unselected and unconditional responsibility for the other, whereas politics is the "sphere of conditioned and regulated relationships" (Heidenreich 2011, 145). According to Bernasconi (1998), the claims of the other, calling me to be responsible, and the rights of the third party, which are conditioned by politics, are neither in a derivation relationship nor in a hierarchical order of priority or chronological order. Rather, the third party, and with it justice, is involved from the start and is held responsible in an indissoluble tension. "The two dimensions of foreign claims and third party rights have their common intersection in the mentioned equating of the unequal, the comparison of the incomparable, which means that the unequal occurs in the same, the incomparable in the compared" (Waldenfels 2006, 132). On the one hand, the relationship of unconditional responsibility towards the other is "a corrective to the socio-political order" (Bernasconi 1998, 90). On the other hand, “the presence of the third party in the face of the other serves to correctively balance the partiality of a relationship with the other that would otherwise have no reason not to ignore the claims of the other others” (ibid.). Levinas himself expresses the tension as follows: "Justice remains justice only in a society in which no distinction is made between near and far, but in which it is also impossible to pass the neighbor" (Levinas 2011, 347).

However, there is a strong tendency in today's political philosophy (and in the inclusion debate, which at the basic theoretical level refers to, among other things, philosophical concepts of the political) to ignore the fundamental responsibility outlined by Levinas. As Stegmeier outlines in a philosophical retrospective, based on Levinas, this is momentous. By referring one-sidedly to the general, the ordered, the principle and the singular, the unique and not subsumable under a general principle, philosophy nourished "the belief in institutions of the general that not only arranged the individual's daily life in advance, but gradually relieved him of his responsibility for the other individuals, alongside law, morality and state, politics, economy and church. The more individuals became members of a general, they settled in it and lost the feeling of their own permanent responsibility for its institutions. Individuals could then act as 'representatives' of the general public and its administration to the best of their knowledge and belief, could believe in the protection of proclaimed norms that it was already good and just to conform to them "(Stegmaier 2002, 67).

And it is precisely this problem that emerges in inclusion: the tendency is that the other person only comes into view as a generalized other under the sign of justice, but not in his uniqueness and singularity. This difference is by no means as marginal as it appears at first glance. Because if it is true that the individual person is more than just a special case of a general human being, that is, if he is singular, then it could be that what is generally ethically required and practically correct is in relation to a person in its singularity proves ethically problematic and practically wrong.

It is this philosophical consideration that leads to the question of whether total inclusion, with its claim to be able to establish justice for everyone without exception, could turn out not only to be difficult, but also to be unjust in a specific individual case.

Final thoughts

I conclude with two remarks. Firstly: Without a doubt, the shift to socio-ethical questions that takes place in the discourse on justice and inclusion and the orientation towards norms anchored in human rights is indispensable for a political foundation of therapeutic and inclusion pedagogical theory. In addition, this orientation also has the advantage of softening the occasionally highly moral climate of earlier ethics debates in curative and special education - although the inclusion heats the minds and this debate also sometimes gets a moralizing note. On the other hand, due to its strong norm orientation, the justice discourse moves the question of inclusion closer to the law. This becomes even more obvious where the human rights highlighted in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities are not only used to justify inclusion, but where a human right to inclusion is read from the convention. This leads to the legalization of the idea of ​​inclusion. Such a development is ambivalent. While on the one hand it safeguards formal, institutional and procedural aspects of inclusion by securing enforceable rights, it can disregard the (if you will: individual ethical) aspect of individual responsibility. But that would have far-reaching consequences, because legalization cannot enforce actual appreciation of people with disabilities, the desire to learn, live and work with them and to respect them as my equals despite all differences. It is therefore neither daring nor undue pessimism to predict that the implementation of inclusion through legalization will not only reach its limits, but will also fail if inclusion does not become a value embodied and lived by a sufficient number of people at the same time. And it is just as clear that only a perspective of justice based on general principles and abstracting from the other person in its singularity will not lead to inclusion.

My second comment is of a more fundamental nature and ties in with the second problem discussed above. Phenomenologically, the implementation of the idea of ​​inclusion can be described as an attempt to not only reorganize the educational and social system through political reforms, but also to establish a new form of order. However, it can be shown that every order is selective and exclusive - here, despite all the differences, phenomenology and systems theory come together in connection with Luhmann. This also applies to those orders that see themselves as comprehensive and inclusive. Waldenfels writes about this: “The extraordinary, which accompanies every order like a shadow, does not mean that something remains outside of order, but that order itself as the establishment and maintenance of order is not based on itself. [...] Opportunities that are excluded have not been eliminated. Flirting with a totally inclusive community that is basically nothing and nobody on the outside is one of those ideas that fade when you try to realize them "(Waldenfels 2012, 298 f.). Recourse to an idea of ​​humanity or an idea of ​​all-encompassing, general humanity turns out to be not unproblematic. Such an idea says: This (a religious practice, a political system, a morality) is something that is suitable for all people without exception. However, humanity “does not represent a limitless we that is able to represent itself and speak in its own name. We cannot get rid of strangeness by appealing to humanity; because it is always a particular authority that claims to speak and fight 'for all of us' without obtaining our consent. Humanity is polyphonic, unanimous humanity is nothing more than a fixed idea, but an effective one "(Waldenfels 2012, 313).

What does this mean for the inclusion debate? Even if this is politically completely incorrect: Without a doubt, the idea of ​​inclusion must be re-examined to see whether it has “blind spots” that become noticeable at the latest when the implementation has previously unintended consequences. It is well known that the idea that inclusion is divisible leads to considerable problems - namely the formation of a “hard core”, which is denied the ability to be included. On the other hand, there has so far hardly been any discussion about the fact that the opposing position, which advocates the indivisibility of inclusion, can be problematic not only for pragmatic, but also for reasons of principle. This problem becomes virulent when, for example, school inclusion is not an option, but is “without alternative”. The particular question then arises as to whether inclusion is actually ethically good per se, as most of its proponents seem to believe. Is inclusion really the only legitimate answer to the demand for non-exclusion? A serious discussion of these questions is still pending in curative and special education.

Bernasconi, Robert (1998): Who is the third? Crossing ethics and politics at Levinas. In: Waldenfels, Bernhard / Därmann, Iris (ed.): The claim of the other. Perspectives on Phenomenological Ethics. Munich, pp. 87-110

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Lindmeier, Christian (2008): Inclusive education as a human right. In: Special Education Promotion Today, Issue 4, pp. 354–374

Lindmeier, Christian (2012): Curative education as the education of participation and inclusion. In: Special Education Promotion Today, Vol. 57, Issue 1, pp. 25–44

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Figure 1. Prof. Dr. Markus Dederich

Latest publications: “Body, Culture and Disability. An Introduction to Disability Studies ”, Bielefeld 2007; “Disability and Recognition”, Stuttgart 2009 (ed. With Wolfgang Jantzen); “Senses, Body and Movement”, Stuttgart 2011 (edited with Wolfgang Jantzen and Renate Walthes); "Recognition and justice in curative education, nursing science and medicine - On the way to non-exclusive ethics", Bielefeld 2011 (ed. With Martin W. Schnell).

University of Cologne

Faculty of Human Sciences

Frangenheimstrasse 4, 50931 Cologne


Markus Dederich: Inclusion and the disappearance of people Published in: Disabled people, magazine for living together, learning and working, No. 1/2013, topic: Disappeared people? Pp. 33-42.

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